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Abstract
This paper examines the macroeconomic consequences of the di-
version of migration ﬂows away from Germany towards the UK in the
course of the EU’s Eastern Enlargement. The EU has agreed transi-
tional periods for the free movement of workers with the new member
states from Central and Eastern Europe. The selective application of
migration restrictions during the transitional periods has resulted in
a reversal of the pre-enlargement allocation of migration ﬂows from
the new member states across the EU. Based on a forecast of the mi-
gration potential under the conditions of free movement and of the
transitional arrangements, we employ a CGE model with imperfect
labour markets to analyse the macroeconomic eﬀects of this diversion
process. We ﬁnd that EU Eastern enlargement has increased in the
GDP per capita in the UK substantially, but that the diversion of mi-
gration ﬂows towards the UK has reduced wage gains and the decline
in unemployment there. The eﬀects of the EU Eastern enlargement
are less favourable for Germany, but the diversion of migration ﬂows
has protected workers there against a detrimental impact on wages
and unemployment.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines the macroeconomic consequences of the diversion of mi-
gration ﬂows during the transitional periods for the free movement of workers
in the course of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU). The
EU has admitted eight new member states from Central and Eastern Europe
in 20041 and another two countries in 2007.2 The income gap between the
incumbent and the new member states is in case of the EU Eastern enlarge-
ment larger than in previous accession rounds. At current exchange rates,
the gross national income per capita of the ten new member states (NMS-10)
amounts to 21 per cent of the EU-15, and – measured in purchasing power
parities – to roughly 40 per cent of the EU-15 at the outset of accession in
2004 (World Bank, 2009). This large income gap has fanned fears that the
removal of immigration restrictions will yield a mass migration wave which
will subsequently depress wages and increase unemployment in the incum-
bent EU member states.
Against this background the EU-15 countries decided at the Goeteborg
summit of the European Council to impose transitional periods for the free
movement of workers from the NMS. The so-called ”2+3+2” formula allows
the individual member states to suspend the free movement of workers for a
period of up to seven years. An extension of the transitional arrangements
for the free movement of labour is ﬁrst considered after two years, then for
a second time after three years. A second prolongation of the transitional
period requires that the member state announces serious imbalances in its
domestic labour market. However, the application of transitional arrange-
ments for the free movement remains a sovereign decision of the individual
member state.
In the course of the 2004 enlargement round, only Sweden applied fully
the Community Law for the free movement of workers since the beginning,
and the UK and Ireland opened their labour markets without restrictions.
Although most other EU member states have opened their labour markets
partially by granting work permits for seasonal workers, (small) immigration
quotas or by concluding bilateral guestworker agreements, the remaining mi-
gration restrictions can be regarded as relatively tight in the sense that they
eﬀectively hindered labour migration between the new and the incumbent
member states.3
1The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Repub-
lic and Slovenia joined the EU at May 1, 2004. Cyprus and Malta also joined the EU in
2004, but the transitional periods for the free movement of workers do not apply to them.
2Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU at January 1, 2007.
3For details see European Commission (2006, 2007) and Br¨ ucker et al. (2009a).
2The selective application of migration restrictions during the transitional
periods had two eﬀects: First, the existing restrictions have hindered migra-
tion such that total migration into the EU is presumably lower than in case
of an EU-wide application of the Community Law for the free movement
of workers. Second, migration ﬂows have been diverted away from the pre-
ferred destinations towards countries which have opened their labour markets
immediately after the EU Eastern enlargement.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 presents the migration development in the course of the EU East-
ern enlargement. Migration data are poorly reported in most EU member
states, such that some uncertainty surrounds the estimates of the actual scale
of east-west migration.4 Based on the information of those countries which
provide migration ﬁgures by country of origin and on the information of the
European Labour Force Survey (LFS) for those countries which do not, we
can estimate the net increase in the number of foreign residents from the
NMS-8 in the EU-15 at about one million people or about 250,000 persons
per annum during the ﬁrst four years following the EU’s Eastern enlargement.
First data suggest that migration ﬂows from the NMS-8 into the EU-15 have
contracted in the course of the ﬁnancial crisis, but EU wide data which would
provide a comprehensive picture are not yet available.
This increase in the migration ﬂows is associated with a distinct diversion
of migration ﬂows away from Germany and Austria as the main destinations
prior to Enlargement towards the UK and Ireland: In 2003, the year before
the EU’s Eastern enlargement, nearly 60 per cent of the foreign citizens from
the NMS-8 residing in the EU were registered in Austria and Germany. This
share has fallen to 41 per cent in 2007, while that of the UK and Ireland
has increased to 52 per cent. At a net increase of the foreign population of
166,000 persons per annum in the ﬁrst four years following the EU Eastern
enlargement, the UK and Ireland receive 70 per cent of the net inﬂows since
2004 compared to 18 per cent before enlargement. In contrast, Austria and
Germany receive only 18 per cent of the inﬂows since 2004.
Interestingly enough, this diversion process did not aﬀect the Scandina-
vian countries: although Sweden has opened its labour market completely
4This is particularly true for Ireland and the UK, the main destinations of migration
from the NMS since enlargement. For a detailed examination of the UK immigration data
see Blanchﬂower et al. (2007) and Br¨ ucker et al. (2009a).
3and Denmark largely, the cumulative net migration ﬂows into these two coun-
tries have been - at some 34,000 persons - almost negligible in the ﬁrst four
years since enlargement. Language, and, perhaps, diﬀerences in labour mar-
ket institutions, might have also played an important role in shaping the
direction of east-west migration ﬂows (Ivlevs 2007).
In this paper we analyse the macroeconomic eﬀects of this diversion pro-
cess for the two economies which are mainly aﬀected in absolute terms, Ger-
many and the UK. We apply diﬀerent policy scenarios for identifying the
macroeconomic eﬀects of migration diversion. The ﬁrst policy scenario sim-
ulates the case that the status quo regarding the immigration conditions is
maintained until the end of the transitional periods in 2011, i.e. that Ger-
many has a restrictive immigration policy in place while the UK keeps the
doors for labour migration from the eight new member states from Central
and Eastern Europe (NMS-8) open. The second policy scenario relies on
the counterfactual assumption that both Germany and the UK have opened
their labour markets for migrants from the NMS-8 already in 2004, which
implies that Germany receives more and the UK less migrants. The compar-
ison of these two scenarios enables us to analyse the eﬀects of the diversion
of migration ﬂows from Germany to the UK.
The migration scenarios are based on forecasts of the migration potential
from the NMS-8. We proceed in two steps to derive our scenarios. First,
we estimate the aggregate migration potential from the NMS-8 into the en-
tire EU-15 under the conditions of free movement and of the transitional
arrangements, using the recent migration episode from the NMS and the mi-
gration experience from other countries for identiﬁcation. Second, we derive
the migration scenarios for Germany and the UK from reasonable assump-
tions about the allocation of migrants between the EU member states under
free movement and the transitional arrangements.
Our macroeconomic analysis employs a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model, which allows simulating the impacts of migration, trade and
capital movements simultaneously. Following Layard et al. (2005) and La-
yard and Nickell (1986), we employ a wage-setting framework which considers
wage rigidites and unemployment. Considering imperfect labour markets is
in our view particularly relevant in the European context with high and
persistent unemployment rates.
We ﬁnd that the removal of barriers to trade and factor movements in
the context of the EU Eastern enlargement generates beneﬁts for Germany
and the UK in terms of a higher GDP per capita and a higher factor in-
come of the native population. The labour market results of our model are
similar to ﬁndings of Barell et.al. (2007) who use a dynamic new-Keynesian
macroeconometric model to analyse the eﬀects of a migration shock follow-
4ing EU-enlargement. Higher migration involves higher aggregate GDP and
employment levels in the receiving country, but reduces the wage increase
and raises unemployment compared to a situation with less migration. The
diversion of migration ﬂows away from Germany towards the UK yields thus
a higher GDP, employment growth and total factor income of the native
population in the UK and a lower one in Germany, while Germany beneﬁts
slightly in terms of higher wages and lower unemployment compared to the
UK.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
our estimate of the EU-wide migration potential from the NMS-8 under the
conditions of the transitional arrangements and of free movement of workers
and the migration scenarios for Germany and the UK which forms the basis
for our further analysis. Section 3 discusses the methodology and theoretical
foundations of the CGE model. Section 4 presents the results of our sim-
ulations under the transitional arrangements and under the counterfactual
assumption of an EU-wide application of the Community laws for the free
movement of labour already in 2004. Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation of the migration potential
The migration scenarios which we apply in the further analysis of the macroe-
conomic eﬀects of the diversion eﬀects have to be based on forecasts of the
migration potential under the conditions of the transitional arrangements
and of the free movement of workers. There exists a large literature which
has estimated the migration potential from the NMS-8 and other countries
to the EU-15 before the EU Eastern enlargement.5 While the aggregate net
increase in the stock of migrants from the NMS-8 in the EU-15 which took
place during the ﬁrst four years after the accession is consistent with most
estimates which have been carried out prior to the EU Eastern enlargement,
the diversion of migration ﬂows away from Germany and Austria towards the
UK and Ireland has not been predicted by the existing literature. The long-
run migration stock from the NMS-8 in the EU-15 has been forecasted by
most econometric studies at about three to ﬁve per cent of the population of
the new member states, while the net inﬂows have been estimated at about
200,000 to 300,000 persons per annum (Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; Bauer
and Zimmermann, 1999; Boeri and Br¨ ucker, 2001; Bruder, 2004). These
estimates have been conﬁrmed by some recent estimates which have been
carried out after enlargement and use current data (Br¨ ucker et al., 2009b;
5For reviews and a critical evaluation of this literature see Br¨ ucker and Siliverstovs
(2006a, 2006b), Br¨ ucker et al. (2009b) and Zaiceva (2007).
5Pytlikova, 2007; Zaiceva, 2006). Nevertheless, some studies have obtained
signiﬁcantly lower (Fertig, 2001; Fertig and Schmidt, 2001; Dustmann et al.,
2003) or higher estimates of the long- and short-run migration potential (Sinn
et al., 2001).
All these econometric forecasts rely on the counterfactual assumption that
all EU member states open their labour markets at the same time. Under this
assumption, most studies forecasted a higher migration potential for Austria
and Germany and a substantially lower one for Ireland and the UK compared
to the actual development after EU enlargement (see e.g. Dustmann et al.,
2003). However, since the rules of the free movement of workers have not
been applied in the entire EU at the same time, we cannot falsify the existing
studies. Note that it was not possible to forecast the migration potential from
the NMS under transitional arrangements before EU enlargement, since the
selective application of transitional arrangements for the free movement of
labour has no historical precedent.6
The selective application of the transitional arrangements and the subse-
quent diversion of migration ﬂows away from Germany and Austria towards
the UK and Ireland highlights a methodological problem which aﬀects to the
best of our knowledge all studies which have forecasted the migration poten-
tial from the NMS: They rely on the irrelevance of independent alternatives
(IIA) assumption, i.e. that migration ﬂows to one country do not depend on
economic and institutional conditions in an other country (see Grogger and
Hanson, 2008, for a discussion). While this assumption is likely to be violated
in most cases since migrants maximise utility across diﬀerent countries. This
is particularly obvious in the context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement where
the selective application of transitional arrangements for the free movement
of labour has resulted in the diversion of migration ﬂows.
Therefore, we employ another approach here. Instead of estimating a
migration model for bilateral country pairs, we estimate the migration from
a number of destinations into the entire EU-15. This approach relies on
the assumption that the choice to move into the EU-15 is independent from
other possible destinations. Since the overwhelming share of the migrants
from the NMS and the other countries included in our sample moves to the
EU-15, ignoring other destinations does not seem to be too restrictive in our
view. By treating the EU as a single destination country, we circumvent
the IIA problem and should obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the
parameters as long as other alternative destinations outside the EU do not
6Transitional measures had also been applied at the accession southern EU countries
like Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986). Nevertheless, there was no selective appli-
cation of transitional agreements. All EU countries agreed on a period of six years in the
case of Greece and a transition period of seven years in the case of Portugal and Spain.
6aﬀect the scale of migration into the EU-15 and as long the EU-15 countries
are relatively homogeneous in their characteristics.
In the second step we use the pre- and post-Enlargement shares of Ger-
many and UK in the total migration stocks and ﬂows from the NMS for
the calculation of migration scenarios for the UK and Germany under the
assumptions (i) that the pre-Enlargement distribution of migration shares
across the EU-15 destination countries would have been constant in case
of an EU-wide introduction of the free movement and (ii) that the post-
Enlargement distribution of migration ﬂows will remain constant if the tran-
sitional arrangements are applied until 2011.
2.1 Specication of the migration function
Building on Boeri and Br¨ ucker (2001), Fertig (2001) and Hatton (1995) we
apply a parsimonious speciﬁcation of the macro migration function here. The
theoretical approach follows a temporary migration framework with hetero-
geneous agents originally developed by Br¨ ucker and Schr¨ oder (2006). Indi-
viduals have the choice to stay at home or to move for a certain period of
their life time or their entire life to another country. They choose the length
of the stay in the foreign country such that they maximise utility over their
life time. The utility of individuals depends on their income in the respective
locations, but also on non-monetary factors such as social relations, cultural
links etc. At a given diﬀerence in the net present value of earnings, the time
spent abroad depends on the weight individuals assign to monetary earnings
and to the non-pecuniary factors relevant for their utility in the respective
locations (see Djajic and Milbourne, 1988; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002,
for similar models). Under the assumption that these preferences are not uni-
form across individuals, an equilibrium relationship between migration stocks
and the diﬀerence in income levels between the host and the home country
emerges. At this equilibrium, the gross emigration rate and the gross re-
turn migration rate are equal, such that net migration ceases (Br¨ ucker and
Schr¨ oder, 2006).









+ a2 ln(eft) + a3 ln(eit) + νfit (1)
where mst∗
fit denotes the long-run or equilibrium share of migrants residing
in destination f in the population from sending country i, wft and wit the
wage rate in the destination and the sending country, and eft and ejt the
7employment rate in the respective countries and νfit the disturbance term.
The subscript f denotes the destination, i.e. the EU-15 in our case, the
subscript i the index of sending countries and the subscript t the time index.
The variables of the model are derived from the standard human capital
model of migration, i.e. utility is determined by expectations on income lev-
els, which are in turn conditioned by employment opportunities. Individuals
are risk averse, but uncertainty focuses on employment opportunities. Hence,
it is expected that the coeﬃcient for the employment rate in the receiving
country is larger than the coeﬃcient for the employment rate in the home
country (Hatton, 1995).
The dynamics of the model are speciﬁed here in form of a simple partial
adjustment mechanism, i.e. as
mst
∗





+ b2 ln(eft) + b3 ln(eit) + b4mstfi;t−1 + υfit (2)
where the coeﬃcient b4 captures the dynamic adjustment of the model. We
assume that b4 < 1, i.e. that the model is dynamically stable. Note that this
does not rule out that networks of previous migrants alleviate migration costs
and facilitate further migration. In contrast, we follow here the literature
that migration networks or migration chains reduce migration costs (Massey
and Espana, 1987). However, since the preference for amenities in the home
country tends to increase for the marginal individual the higher the share of
the population is that already lives abroad, the declining costs for migration
resulting from networks are eventually oﬀset by the high costs to move abroad
for individuals in the remaining population.
2.2 Identication strategy
As outlined above, we treat the EU-15 here as a single destination in order
to circumvent or at least to mitigate the IIA problem. Although income
levels and employment opportunities across the individual EU-15 countries
are relatively homogeneous, there still exist some diﬀerences which might be
hidden if we average all variables of the model across the destination countries
in the EU-15. We have therefore weighted all earnings and employment
variables of individual EU-15 countries by their share in the EU-15 migrants
from a speciﬁc sending countries. In order to avoid an endogeneity problem,
we have used the average shares during the entire sample period. We expect
that this procedure increases the explanatory power of the model compared
to simply using the EU-15 averages of the explanatory variables.
For the identiﬁcation of the impact of diﬀerent immigration regimes we
8use the variance in the data from diﬀerent country groups. We assume that
immigration regimes aﬀect both the absolute terms and the slope parameters
of the model. In general form we write the migration function in equation






′ (zfit  xft) + λ
′ (zfit  yit)
+ δ mstfi;t−1 + υit
where xft denotes a vector of variables which captures the relevant explana-
tory variables such as the per capita income level and the employment rate
in the EU-15, yit a vector of explanatory variables which aﬀects migration
incentives in the sending country, zfit a vector of dummy variables which
captures an institutional regime which aﬀects migration opportunities and
costs between the EU-15 and sending country i, and α, β, γ, η and λ denote
the corresponding vectors of coeﬃcients.
The error term υfit is speciﬁed here as one-way error component model,
i.e. as
υfit = µfi + ξfit, (4)
where µfi is a country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect which captures all time-invariant
variables such as geographical distance, language, and cultural proximity
which aﬀect migration decisions, and ξfit is white noise.
The speciﬁcation of the error term can have important implications for
migration forecasts. Most macro migration models in the literature are either
estimated by pooled ordinary least squares or with a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator.
Br¨ ucker and Siliverstovs (2006a, 2006b) have tested the forecasting perfor-
mance of diﬀerent macro migration models based on a data set which is
similar to that we employ here and found that a standard model with coun-
try speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects outperforms pooled OLS, random eﬀects, GMM and
heterogeneous estimation procedures, i.e. estimators which allow the slope
parameters of the model to diﬀer across countries. Therefore, we apply a
standard ﬁxed eﬀects estimator here.
The model in equation (3) considers diﬀerent immigration regimes, which
can aﬀect the scale of migration both via the absolute terms and via the slope
parameters. Under the assumption that the slope parameters are uniform
across countries for a given institutional regime, we can use the estimated
parameters of the model to identify how a change in the institutional regime
aﬀects migration. As an example, if the NMS respond similarly as other
EU member states under free movement to explanatory variables such as
the income diﬀerential and the employment rate, we can use the estimated
9parameters of the free movement dummy and the interaction dummies of
free movement with explanatory variables for identifying the impact of a
switch from the transitional arrangements to free movement. However, it
is worthwhile noting that countries might be heterogeneous, i.e. that the
migration behaviour of the NMS may diﬀer in one way or another from
that of the EU-15 member states. The assumption of homogenous slope
parameters is, however, needed for the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of diﬀerent
institutional conditions.
In the speciﬁcation of the model we consider the following institutional
regimes:
 transitional arrangements for the NMS-8 between 2004 and 2007 and
for the NMS-2 in 2007 (TRANSfit);
 bilateral (guestworker) agreements between individual EU-15 and Bul-
garia and Romania which were in place since the end of the 1990s
(GUESTfit);
 restricted immigration, which holds for third countries such as Turkey,
Morocco and Tunisia as well as for the NMS before the transitional
arrangements or the bilateral agreements were in place (RESTRfit);
 emigration restrictions which were in place for citizens from most NMS
under the so-called iron curtain (IRONfit).
For each regime we created a dummy variable, which was included as
a level variable and as an interaction variable with all other explanatory
variables of the model. Moreover, we considered an intercept dummy in
order to capture the migration conditions for countries which are aﬀected by
the wars in the former Yugoslavia (WARfit).
2.3 Data
Our sample consists of 28 sending countries during the period 1982 to 2007:
The ”old” EU member states with the exception of Luxembourg (14), the
NMS-8, the NMS-2 (Bulgaria and Romania), the (former) Yugoslavia, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. This sample thus covers - with the exception of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - the entire European conti-
nent and the main sending countries in the Mediterranean region. Moreover,
the EU-15 is the main destination for migrants from these countries such
that the assumption of the irrelevance of independent alternatives is not too
demanding. For this reason we have excluded the CIS countries from the
10sample, since ethnic disentangling plays an important role there. Other des-
tinations such as Russia are therefore important alternatives to the EU-15
in case of the CIS.
Altogether, our sample covers more than 80 per cent of the immigrants
residing in the EU-15. Due to data limitations, the sample is not balanced.
Note that we can include only those sending countries for which (almost)
the entire EU-15 report migration stocks. The data on migration stocks are
derived from the statistics of the EU-15 destination countries. Whenever
possible, we have used the national population statistics, and the Eurostat
Labour Force Survey in the remaining cases. However, in order to avoid
structural breaks we rely only on one data source for a given destination.
These data have then been aggregated to calculate the number of migrants
in the EU-15. Since national data sources and nationality concepts diﬀer
across the EU, some measurement error is unavoidable.
As an approximation for average earnings we have used the GDP per
capita at current exchange rates and at purchasing power parities. The
GDP per capita at current exchange rates have been taken from the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank (2009) and the GDP per capita
at purchasing power parities from the series provided by Angus Maddison
and the University of Groningen. Our ﬁndings suggest that the forecasting
performance of the GDP variable at current exchange rates has turned out to
be better as the income measured at purchasing power parities, we decided to
use the GDP per capita at current exchange rates in the regressions presented
here. Note that time series of wage data are not available for our country
sample.
For the calculation of the employment rates we used the standardised un-
employment rates (ILO norm) provided by Eurostat which have been comple-
mented by national statistical sources in some cases. The population ﬁgures
have been taken from Eurostat. The destination country variables (i.e. the
EU-15 variables) have been calculated by weighting the variables across the
destinations with the immigrant shares as outlined above.
The panel is not balanced due to data limitations in some countries. For
a detailed description of the data set see Br¨ ucker et al. (2009b).
2.4 Estimation results
The estimation results are displayed in Table 2. We have estimated four spec-
iﬁcations of the model here. First, we estimated a simple ﬁxed eﬀects model
which considers the income diﬀerence between the EU-15 and the sending
country and the immigration restrictions including the interaction terms be-
tween the immigration restrictions and the income diﬀerential only. Second,
11we employed a ﬁxed eﬀects model which considers in addition the employ-
ment rates in the EU-15 and the sending countries. Third, we estimated
this model also with Feasible GLS and cross-sectional weights allowing for
heteroscedasticity in the disturbances. Testing this model against the second
speciﬁcation suggests that heteroscedasticity is present. Moreover, the pre-
dictive power of the model is higher compared to the second model. Finally,
we estimated the same model allowing furthermore for serial correlation in
the error terms since our speciﬁcation tests suggest that the disturbances are
indeed serially correlated.
Table 2 about here
Since we are interested in the forecasting performance here, we report in
Table 2 beyond the standard regression statistics also the root mean squared
per centage forecasting error (RMSPE) for the NMS-8 in the period 2001-
2007. We ﬁnd that the forecasting error declines from model to model. In
our preferred speciﬁcation, the FGLS model with cross-sectional weights and
serial correlation, the RMSPE is at 8.9 per cent reasonably low given the
substantial uncertainty which surrounded the migration potential from the
NMS after the introduction of the transitional arrangements for the free
movement of labour.
The qualitative results conﬁrm largely our theoretical expectations. The
income diﬀerence between the EU-15 and the sending countries has in all
four speciﬁcations the expected positive sign and appears signiﬁcant. The
employment rate in the EU-15 has the expected positive sign, while the
employment rates in the sending countries have the expected negative signs,
although both variables do not appear as signiﬁcant.
The interaction dummy variables can only be interpreted together with
the signs and the size of the level dummy variables. As a consequence, the
impact of the income gap as well as the impact of the employment variables
are either reduced or increase with the respective dummy variables. As ex-
pected, the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia have exerted a strong positive
impact on migration from the aﬀected countries into the EU-15.
2.5 Migration scenarios
The coeﬃcients of the feasible GLS model with serial correlation in the dis-
turbances (FGLS-2) in Table 2 are used for the simulation of potential migra-
tion from the NMS-8 into the EU-15 under diﬀerent institutional conditions
12for the period from 2004 until 2011. In our simulations we have assumed
that the GDP per capita at current exchange rates converges to the level of
the EU-15 at an annual rate of 3 per cent.7 Furthermore, we have assumed
that unemployment rates remain constant at their 2007 levels, since it is
not possible to predict unemployment rates. Thus, our scenario is based on
a convergence scenario under ”normal” economic conditions, but does not
consider the recent changes in the economic environment since the begin of
the ﬁnancial crisis.
Figure 1 displays three simulations: The ”migration restrictions” scenario
assumes that the migration restrictions which have been in place before the
EU Eastern enlargement are maintained beyond 2004. The ”transitional
arrangements” scenario assumes that the transitional arrangements for the
free movement of labour which have been in place from 2004 onwards are
maintained until the end of 2011. Finally, the ”free movement” scenario
assumes that the EU applies the rules for the free movement of labour already
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Figure 1: Potential migration stocks from NMS-8 in EU-15, 2004-11
According to our estimates the stock of foreign residents from the NMS-8
7This is empirically supported by convergence regressions for the EU-15. Note that
the GDP per capita at current exchanges rates converges faster than the GDP per capita
at purchasing power parities due to the appreciation of the currency in the course of real
convergence.
13in the EU-15 would have increased without EU Eastern enlargement moder-
ately from about 900,000 persons in 2002 to 1.3 millions by the end of 2011.
The partial removal of the migration barriers under the transitional arrange-
ments yields a substantial increase in the number of migrants according to
our projections: the stock of foreign residents from the NMS-8 is estimated
to number 2.75 million persons at the end of 2011. Finally, the introduc-
tion of the free movement would have triggered an additional migration of
350,000 persons compared to the transitional arrangement scenario such that
the stock of foreign residents from the NMS-8 in the EU-15 would amount
3.1 million persons at the end of 2011. The scenario presented here refer to
point estimates, conﬁdence intervals can be pretty large (see Br¨ ucker et al.,
2009b).
A number of caveats apply to these estimates: First, the estimates under
the current institutional conditions are based on only few annual observa-
tions, which might be insuﬃcient to identify the parameters of the model
properly. Second, the free movement scenario assumes that the slope pa-
rameters for the explanatory variables such as the income diﬀerence and the
employment rates are the same under free movement for the EU-15 send-
ing countries and the NMS. This need, however, not to be the case. Third,
particularly the migration data used for the estimates are subject to mea-
surement error which may bias the results in one way or another. Finally,
the projections presented here are based on estimates of long-run equilibrium
relationships between the migration stocks and the explanatory variables and
the speed of adjustment to these long-run relationships. The estimates do
therefore not capture short-term ﬂuctuations in the business cycle appropri-
ately, such that short-term migration movements may deviate substantially.
The later aspect is particularly relevant in the context of the current
ﬁnancial crisis. As can be observed already in a number of countries, ac-
tual migration ﬁgures have declined substantially as a consequence of the
deterioration in the economic conditions in the receiving countries.
Thus, Figure 1 presents a forecast for the development of the aggregate
migration stocks from the NMS-8 in the EU-15 under diﬀerent institutional
conditions, although actual ﬁgures may deviate in one way or another from
these scenarios. Nevertheless, the root mean squared percentage forecasting
error has been at about 9 per cent relatively moderate under the conditions
of the transitional arrangements.
For our further analysis we need not only a projection of the aggregate
migration potential from the NMS-8 in the EU-15, but also one for Germany
and the UK under the transitional arrangements and under the counterfac-
tual situation of an EU-wide introduction of the rules for the free movement
of labour already in 2004 in order to capture the diversion of migration ﬂows.
14Since a free movement counterfactual does not exist for the NMS, we have to
base these scenarios on reasonable assumptions rather than on econometric
estimates.
We apply the following assumptions to capture the diversion eﬀect: First,
we assume that the shares of Germany and the of UK in the migration ﬂows
from the NMS-8 between 2004 and the end of 2007 will remain constant
until 2011 if the transitional arrangements for the free movement of labour
are maintained. This is in our view a reasonable assumption, since the 2004-
2007 allocation of migration ﬂows from the NMS-8 across the EU-15 countries
is not likely to change much in the years 2008-2011 if the same institutional
conditions continue.
Second, we assume that the shares of Germany and the UK in the migra-
tion stock of the NMS-8 before the EU Eastern enlargement remains constant
if the free movement would have been introduced in the entire EU already
in 2004. This assumption is a bit more arbitrary than the ﬁrst one, since the
pre-Enlargement allocation of migration ﬂows and stocks might have been al-
ready distorted by institutional barriers in one way or another. Nevertheless,
since all destination countries had similar immigration restrictions in place
before enlargement, the pre-Enlargement shares may serve as a reasonable
approximation of the shares of Germany and the UK in the migration ﬂows
from the NMS under the free movement counterfactual.
Table 3 about here
Table 3 displays the migration scenarios for Germany and the UK under
the transitional arrangements and the free movement in the 2004-11 period.
In the transitional arrangement scenario we used the actual migration ﬁgures
for the 2004-2007 period, the ﬁgures for the 2008-11 period are estimated.
Under the assumptions and estimates outlined above, the UK receives a cu-
mulative net inﬂux of almost 900,000 persons in the 2004-2011 period under
the transitional arrangements according to our scenarios, while this net in-
ﬂow is reduced to 321,000 persons under the counterfactual assumption of an
EU-wide introduction of the free movement of workers in 2004. Conversely,
Germany receives a cumulative net inﬂow of 269,000 persons under the tran-
sitional arrangements, but of 1.26 millions under the conditions of the free
movement in the 2004-2011 period according to our projections.
The diﬀerence between the two scenarios captures mainly the diversion of
migration ﬂows away from Germany towards the UK and other destinations
due to the selective application of the transitional arrangements. The EU-15
15would have received some 360,000 migrants more from the NMS-8 in case
of an EU-wide introduction of the free movement in 2004 compared to the
situation under the transitional arrangements.
3 The macroeconomic framework
We use an applied general equilibrium model which considers wage rigidities
and unemployment for our analysis of the macroeconomic eﬀects of migra-
tion diversion. In the European context, it is particularly important to con-
sider imperfect labour markets and unemployment. Building on Boeri and
Br¨ ucker (2005), Br¨ ucker and Jahn (2011) and Levine (1999) we apply there-
fore a wage-setting framework here for analyzing the wage and employment
eﬀects of immigration. Our model is based on the assumption that actors
in the labour market set the wage such that it declines if the unemployment
rate increases. This is consistent with right-to-manage models of collective
wage bargaining (e.g. Nickell and Andrews, 1983) or eﬃciency wage theo-
ries derived from turnover cost (Salop 1979) or shirking models (Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984). We do not present an explicit wage bargaining or eﬃciency
wage model here since both types of models are relevant in our context.
While the papers quoted above rest on a simple one good framework, we
derive the macroeconomic eﬀects of migration here from multi-sectoral CGE
model which considers trade, capital mobility and intergovernmental trans-
fers.
The wage-setting framework explains unemployment by the interaction
between price- and wage-setting. The traditional labour supply function is
replaced by a wage-setting function, which assumes that the real wage rate is
a declining function of the unemployment rate and may deviate from market
clearing levels. Applying the right-to-manage assumption, ﬁrms hire labour
up to a level where the proﬁts are maximized at the given wage rate.
The conventional assumptions of the wage-setting framework on labour
demand enables us to apply a CGE framework for the analysis of the remain-
ing features of the economy. The model we apply here has a comparative-
static character and follows the neoclassic-structuralist tradition which has
inspired most of the CGE-literature (see Dervis et al., 1982).8 The equa-
tions of the model are derived from microeconomic assumptions about the
behaviour of price taking agents. Based on recent input-output tables, we
8Our speciﬁc model is based on the well-established framework of the International
Food Project Research Institute (IFPRI) developed by Lofgren et al. 2002. We have
extended this model to a one country-two regions model and used recent input-output
matrices from Poland and the UK.
16apply an open-economy framework which considers beyond immigration the
impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on trade, capital mobility and inter-
governmental transfers.
A complete description of the CGE model we apply here is beyond the
scope of this paper. Instead we outline the theoretical framework in Section
3.1 and brieﬂy describe the CGE model which we apply here in Section 3.2.
Further details on the CGE model are presented in the technical appendix.
3.1 Outline of the wage-setting framework
Suppose that the revenue function of the destination country is given by
Y (p,L,K), where p is a k-dimensional vector of commodity prices, L an
n-dimensional vector of labour inputs, and the scalar K the physical capi-
tal stock of the economy. Consumers are price takers and maximize utility
subject to their budget constraint. Competition on output markets is per-
fect such that ﬁrms are price takers as well and minimize unit costs. The
production possibility set of the economy is assumed to be closed, bounded
from above and convex. Under these assumptions, the revenue function is
increasing, linear homogenous and concave in the input factors.
Let ¯ Ni, i = 1,...,n be the pre-migration labor force in each cell i of the
labour market. The post-migration labour force is then given by
Ni = ¯ Ni + γiM,
n ∑
i=1
γi = 1, (5)
where the scalar M is the total labour inﬂux and γi is the share of workers
of type i among the total immigrants.
Wages and the demand for labour are determined sequentially. In the
ﬁrst stage, wages are ﬁxed. In the second stage, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms hire
workers until the marginal value of labour productivity equals the ongoing
wage rate. Writing the wage for labour of type i, wi, as a function of the
unemployment rate, ui, gives
wi = ϕi(ui), ϕ
′
i < 0, (6)
where ϕi is a function that captures the response of the wage to the unem-
ployment rate, and the unemployment rate is deﬁned as ui = 1  
Li
Ni, where
Li and Ni denote the employed workforce and the labour force, respectively.
Note that we have normalized the numeraire good to one without loss of
generality.
When commodity prices are given, the wage rate wi equals the partial




where wi is linearly homogeneous in p and homogeneous of degree zero in
the input factors.
The condition that the wage rate in equation (6) equals the value of
the marginal product of labour in equation (7) determines the employment
response to a change in labour supply. Solving for the employment response
requires solving a system of equations. This system has to satisfy in each
cell of the labour market the implicit function
Φi(L,M)  wi(p,L,K(M))   ϕi(ui(Li,Ni(M))) = 0, 8 i. (8)
Diﬀerentiating this system implicitly with respect to a marginal migration

































where f is a vector of functions that determine the wage response to the
unemployment rate, and N a vector of the labour force in each segment of
the labour market. We assume that the capital stock may adjust to a labor
supply shock through migration, i.e., that dK
dM  0.
Finally, having solved for the employment response, it is straightforward



















Equations (9) and (10) enable us to derive the channels by which immi-
gration can aﬀect (un-)employment and wages.
To illustrate the mechanics of the model it is useful to distinguish three
extreme cases: ﬁrst, consider the case of a small open economy where the
number of goods equals the number of factors. According to the Rybczynski-
theorem, the composition of output changes under these conditions, while




@K = 0, we have from equations (9) and (10)
dLi
dM







18in every segment of the labour market.
Second, assume that
@pi
@Li < 0 and
@wi
@Li < 0, but that labour markets are
perfectly ﬂexible, which requires that ϕ′
i !  1 and that ui ! 0 8 ϕi. In







and the wage response is given by equation (10) with L ! N. This case
corresponds to the textbook model of migration with perfect labour markets.
Finally, assume that labour markets are completely inﬂexible, i.e., that
ϕ′






















which equals zero if the capital stock does not adjust to the labour supply
shock, i.e. if @w
@K is zero. As in the case of the famous Harris and Todaro
(1970) model, the wage rate remains constant if the capital stock is ﬁxed,
while the increase in unemployment equals the additional labour supply of
the immigrants.
In our empirical speciﬁcation we consider however the empirically relevant
case, i.e., when 0 > ϕ′
i >  1, where employment adjusts partially to a
labour supply shock through migration.
3.2 Outline of the CGE model
Following Boehringer (2003) the general equilibrium in the CGE model is
speciﬁed as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) where equilibrium
conditions are formulated as weak inequalities and conditions of complemen-
tary slackness between variables and equilibrium conditions. The model is set
up as a Arrow-Debreu economy with 16 commodities and 16 domestic indus-
tries. In total there are 2 agricultural industries, 4 manufacturing industries
and 10 service industries. Each commodity corresponds to an industry.
Most parameters in the model are calibrated, a procedure commonly used
in CGE modeling (e.g. Mansur and Whalley, 1984). To calibrate the model a
consistent one year dataset is needed. For the calibration we employ country-
speciﬁc input-output matrices provided by Eurostat. This enables us to
consider the recent developments in the interconnection between trade, factor
movements and production. For Germany and the UK we use the latest
available tables, describing the economy in 2004. These matrices satisfy the
microeconomic equilibrium conditions and therefore can be used to calibrate
19the model.
The elasticities of substitution between capital and labour and the Arm-
ington elasticities of substitution between international and domestic con-
sumption goods cannot be calibrated. We therefore use standard substi-
tution elasticities and estimates of Armington elasticities provided by the
GTAP database (see Table A1).
The elasticities of the wage-setting curves have been estimated (see Baas
et al., 2009). We ﬁnd an elasticity between wages and the unemployment
rate of -0.10 for Germany and of -0.13 for the UK, which might reﬂect diﬀer-
ences in labour market institutions and the wage-setting mechanism in both
countries. We have estimated the elasticity of the wage-setting curves at the
macro-level using the variance over time for identiﬁcation. Our ﬁndings are
however very close to those of the regional wage curve literature, which and
elasticity of about -0.1 on average (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1994, 1995;
Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). Applying for both countries an elasticity of -0.1
does not change our results substantially.
The model is solved using the GAMS software initially developed by the
World Bank. Within the GAMS package we use the Path Solver which is
designed to solve mixed complementarity problems.
4 Simulation results
The EU Eastern enlargement does not only aﬀect migration, but also trade
and capital movements. We assume therefore in both migration policy sce-
narios that the removal of barriers to trade and capital movements is irre-
versible and that therefore the dynamic development in trade and capital
ﬂows continues. Trade and capital movements have considerably increased
before and after the EU-enlargement, but the individual member states are
aﬀected in diﬀerent ways: The EU-15 countries neighbouring the NMS such
as Austria and Germany have the highest trade shares with the NMS, while
the UK and Ireland are only moderately aﬀected. As an example, Germany
exported goods of a value of 89.7 billion Euros to the NMS and imported
goods of a value 74.2 billion Euros from the NMS in 2006 (Deutsche Bundes-
bank, 2007), while exports of the UK to the NMS amounted to 31.2 billion
Euros and imports to 41.1 billion Euros (ONS, 2006). We assume here that
the dynamic development of trade and capital movements continues. The im-
pact of opening labour markets to migration on trade and capital movements
is reﬂected by our CGE model, i.e. the size of trade and capital movements
is determined endogenously.
In order to identify the eﬀects of migration diversion on the economy of
20Germany and the UK, we simulate a baseline and two policy scenarios. The
baseline scenario describes a world without enlargement and no immigration
from the NMS-8. As outlined in Section 2.5, the eﬀects of migration diversion
are captured by two policy scenarios: the ﬁrst policy scenario displays the
status quo in immigration policies for both Germany and the UK under the
transitional periods for the free movement of workers. The second scenario
is based on the counterfactual assumption that all EU-15 member states
have opened their labour markets for migration from the NMS-8 already in
2004. We can thus compare the counterfactual scenario of a EU with free
movement with a EU where migration barriers hinder migration and divert
migration ﬂows away from the preferred destinations. The diﬀerence between
the transitional arrangement and the free movement scenario is treated here
as the diversion eﬀect.
The scenarios are calculated for the period from 2004 to 2011, i.e. they
capture the period until the end of the transitional arrangements for the free
movement of workers.
Table 4 about here
Table 4 presents the macroeconomic eﬀects of the EU Eastern enlarge-
ment for the UK and Germany. It reports the change of the two policy
scenarios compared to the baseline scenario for all variables except for the
unemployment rate in per cent and for the unemployment rate in percentage
points. The simulations presented here consider the impact of Eastern en-
largement on migration, trade, capital movements and governmental trans-
fers. Please note that governmental transfers do not cover the impact of
migration on the welfare state.
The EU Eastern enlargement increases through a reduction of transac-
tion costs GDP, trade, investment, private and governmental consumption
and employment in both countries. Moreover, the EU enlargement has in-
creased not only the aggregate GDP, but also the real GDP per capita in
Germany and the UK. The gains are however not equally distributed. While
in the UK both capital and labour gain from the EU Eastern enlargement,
the wage rate declines slightly and the unemployment rate increases moder-
ately in Germany under the transitional arrangement scenario. The diﬀerent
development in UK and Germany can be traced back to the fact that in-
dustries with low wages increase their activity more than proportionally in
Germany, while industries with wages above the average beneﬁt in the UK.
The migration ﬂows in the aftermath of EU-enlargement has increased
the labour stock of Germany and the UK, but the UK attracted much more
21migrants due to lower labour market restrictions during the transitional pe-
riods. This yields a higher GDP gain for the UK under the transitional
arrangements: 2.24 per cent compared to 1.08 per cent in case of an EU-
wide free movement. In contrast, the German GDP increases from 0.64 in
the transitional arrangement scenario compared to 1.59 per cent in the free
movement scenario. The converse development can be observed for the GDP
per capita: The GDP per capita gains increase from 0.48 per cent in the
transitional arrangement scenario to 0.84 per cent in the free movement sce-
nario in the UK. This can be traced back simply to the fact that immigrants
don’t bring capital. In the German case, the GDP per capita gains of 0.3
per cent under the transitional arrangements decline only marginally in case
of free movement. This can be explained by the fact that migrants move in
Germany more than in the UK to high productivity sectors.
Accordingly, the migration diversion towards the UK involves that the
growth of investment, private consumption, governmental consumption and
trade is about 1.2 per cent higher in the transitional arrangement scenario
compared to the free movement scenario, while it is reduced under the tran-
sitional arrangements in Germany by a similar amount.
Migration and trade are complements in our simulations, which can be
traced back to the fact that labour tends to move more than proportionally
into manufacturing and other tradable sectors. However, this tendency is
much more pronounced in the UK compared to Germany, where also non-
tradable sectors increase their activities substantially (see below). The di-
version of migrants towards the UK under the transitional arrangements
increases EU and RoW exports and imports there by about 1.2 per cent
compared to the free movement scenario, while German exports fall by 0.5
and imports by about 1 per cent under the transitional arrangement scenario
compared to the free movement scenario.
The diversion of migration ﬂows increases the income of capital owners
in the UK by almost 0.9 per cent and reduces it in Germany by 0.7 per
cent. In contrast, the wage gains drop by 0.17 per cent in the UK as a result
of migration diversion, while the diversion process prevented that German
wages would have declined by about 0.45 per cent. Moreover, the diversion
process reduces the decline in the unemployment rate of the UK marginally
by 0.07 percentage points, while the German unemployment rate would have
increased by almost 0.43 percentage points in case of free movement compared
to 0.15 under the transitional arrangements.
Altogether, the migration diversion increases GDP gains from Eastern
enlargement and the income of capital owners in the UK, but reduces the
gains of workers in terms of higher wages and lower unemployment risks. The
converse is true for Germany. The transitional arrangements have moreover
22reduced the joint GDP gain of Germany and the UK by 0.11 per cent as a
consequence of less migration and migration diversion (not displayed here).
Table 5 about here
The sectoral eﬀects of the EU’s Eastern enlargement and our migration
scenarios are presented in Table 6. As can be seen there, the manufacturing
industries expand their activities more than proportional in the UK. Under
the transitional arrangements, some other sectors such as hotels and restau-
rants, construction, health and household services increase their activity also
more than proportional. In contrast, the German manufacturing sector bene-
ﬁts much less from EU Eastern enlargement compared to that of the UK. The
inﬂux of labour expands particularly non-tradable activities such as house-
hold work, hotels and restaurant and construction there. As a consequence,
the immigration surge in the free movement scenario has a more detrimen-
tal impact on labour markets in Germany compared to the UK, where the
expansion of tradable sectors mitigates the labour supply shock.
Note that we ﬁnd larger economic gains from the EU Eastern enlargement
than previous studies. As an example, Baldwin et al. (1997) calculate the
total gain in GDP for the EU-15 at 0.2 per cent, while Heijdra et al. (2002)
predicted that EU enlargement will increase the GDP in Germany by 0.67%.
The Hejdra et al. (2002) study is inter alia based on a migration projection
which is similar to our free movement scenario. The diﬀerence between the
ﬁndings in the previous literature and ours can be traced back mainly to the
fact that trade links between the incumbent and the new EU member states
have been largely underestimated in models using input-output tables before
1995.
5 Conclusion
The transitional periods for the free movement of workers have resulted in
a reversal of the pre-enlargement distribution of migrants from the NMS
across the EU-15. Based on a counterfactual scenario, which relies on the
assumption that the free movement of workers would have been granted to
the citizens of the NMS-8 in all EU-15 countries already in 2004, we have
analysed the macroeconomic consequences of this diversion process for two
mainly aﬀected countries, Germany and the UK. Our ﬁndings indicate that
the diversion of migration ﬂows increased the GDP, employment growth and
23total factor income of the native population in the UK whereas Germany
could not beneﬁt from an increase in labour.
The transitional periods for the free movement of workers also impact the
distribution of income. The productivity gains from the EU Eastern enlarge-
ment and the increase in trade implies that the income of workers and capital
owners increase in the UK, while the unemployment rate declines there in all
scenarios. The situation is less favourable in Germany, where wages decline
and unemployment increases slightly in the free movement scenario. The di-
version of migration ﬂows has reduced the wage gains in the UK marginally,
while the unemployment rate declines slightly less than in case of an EU-wide
introduction of the free movement there. In contrast, workers in Germany
beneﬁt from the diversion of migration ﬂows during the transitional peri-
ods. Thus, although the transitional migration restrictions in Germany and
other EU-15 countries create an aggregate loss for the incumbent EU member
states, their distributional impact remains ambiguous.
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29Technical Appendix
The wage-setting framework which we use for our analysis of the macroe-
conomic eﬀects of immigration has been outlined in Section 3.1. Following
Boehringer et al. (2003) the general equilibrium in the CGE model is speci-
ﬁed as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). The main diﬀerence to the
framework sketched in Section 3.1 is that we consider not only labour and
capital as inputs, but also intermediate goods. For a compact presentation
of the model we have changed the notation.
Consider an Arrow-Debreu economy where the endogenous variables can
be classiﬁed into three categories (Mathiesen 1985). A non-negative a-
dimensional vector of prices p for all goods and factors including export
and import goods, Y a non-negative m-dimensional vector for activity lev-
els of production sectors including foreign production and E a non-negative
q-dimensional vector of incomes and earnings including transfers.
In equilibrium, the zero-proﬁt condition for ﬁrms which produce under
constant returns to scale has to be fulﬁlled:
Πj(p) = Rj(p)   Cj(p)  0 8 j, (11)
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the unit
cost function. The functions fj and gj characterize feasible input-output
combinations in sector j. Finally, i is an index for commodity or factor i.
In this general framework, we consider not only capital and labour, but also
intermediaries as inputs.













Dih 8 i, (12)
where Yj is output of sector j, Bih is the initial endowment of commodity or
factor i of household h and Dih the ﬁnal demand for good i of household h.
We apply the right-to-manage assumption in our wage-setting framework.
Consequently, once wages are ﬁxed, ﬁrms hire labour up to an amount where
proﬁts are maximized. This implies that the employed labour force can be
below the initial labour endowment of households, i.e. Lih  Nih, where Lih
denotes employed labour and Nih the initial labour endowment. Thus, the









(1   uih)Nih  0 8 i, (13)
where wi denotes the wage rate and ui the unemployment rate. Note that
(1   uih)Nih = Lih. As outlined in Section 3.1, the wage rate is a function
of the unemployment rate. Thus, if we replace each labour input Ni by
(1 ui)Ni in the vector of initial endowments B, we can apply equation (12)
for deriving the demand on goods and factor markets.










where Eh denotes income and Uh utility of household h. The budget con-
straint of households is given by
∑
h
pi Bih = Eh 
∑
h
pi Dih 8 h. (15)
We use a Stone-Geary utility function which is non-satiation. Therefore
households are always on their budget line, i.e.
∑
h pi Bih = Eh =
∑
h pi Dih
and Walras’ law holds.




YjΠj(p) = 0, (16)


























= 0 8 h. (19)
The general equilibrium problem features complementarity between equi-
librium variables and equilibrium market conditions. Therefore it can be
described as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) (Cottle and Pang,
311992; Rutherford, 1995):
Given : f : R
n 7! R
n (20)
Find : z 2 R
n (21)
s.t. : f(z)  0,z  0,z
Tf(z) = 0 (22)





The presentation of the equilibrium problem here is very compact. A de-
tailed description of the equations of the model is available from the authors
upon request.
32Table 1: Residents from the NMS-8 in the EU-15, 2003-2007
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
in 1,000 persons in % of host population
AT1 60.3 68.9 77.3 84.0 89.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
BE1 16.2 19.5 25.6 32.2 42.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
DK1 9.8 11.6 14.3 16.5 22.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
FIN1 15.8 16.5 18.3 20.8 24.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
FR2 33.9 43.1 36.2 44.2 37.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
DE1;3 480.7 438.9 481.7 525.1 554.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
GRE2 16.4 15.2 19.5 18.4 19.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
IE4 n.a. 43.5 94.0 147.9 178.5 n.a. 1.1 2.3 3.5 4.1
IT1 54.7 66.2 77.9 91.3 117.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
LX1 1.6 2.3 3.5 4.2 5.1 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1
NL1 13.0 17.8 23.2 28.3 36.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
PT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ESP1 46.7 61.8 77.8 100.8 131.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
SWE1 21.1 23.3 26.9 33.8 42.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
UK5 122.5 121.0 219.8 357.5 609.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0
EU-15 892.6 949.5 1,195.9 1,505.0 1,910.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
All ﬁgures refer to December 31 of each year.
Notes: 1) National population statistics.– 2) Eurostat Labour Force Survey.– 3) 2006
and 2005 are not comparable to previous year due to data revisions.– 4) Irish LFS (4th
quarter).– 5) UK LFS (2nd quarter).
33Table 2: Estimation Results
FE (1) FE (2) FGLS (1) FGLS (2)
coeﬀ. t-stat. coeﬀ. t-stat. coeﬀ. t-stat. coeﬀ. t-stat.
msti;t 1 0.949 50.01 0.940 44.90 0.940 47.14 0.954 50.78
ln
yf;t 1
yi;t 1 0.003 2.21 0.003 2.18 0.003 2.35 0.003 2.74
lnef;t 1 0.015 1.39 0.015 1.43 0.012 1.28
lnei;t 1 -0.004 -0.71 -0.004 -0.76 -0.006 -1.00
TRANSit  ln
yf;t 1
yi;t 1 -0.002 -1.64 0.001 0.42 0.001 0.45 0.001 0.45
TRANSit  lnef;t 1 0.091 2.34 0.090 2.43 0.083 2.57
TRANSit  lnei;t 1 -0.019 -1.19 -0.019 -1.22 -0.017 -1.34
GUESTit  ln
yf;t 1
yi;t 1 -0.002 -1.70 -0.008 -1.90 -0.008 -1.91 -0.004 -0.85
GUESTit  lnef;t 1 -0.131 -1.40 -0.131 -1.40 -0.038 -0.34
GUESTit  lnei;t 1 -0.011 -0.64 -0.011 -0.65 -0.006 -0.24
RESTRit  ln
yf;t 1
yi;t 1 -0.004 -3.27 -0.003 -2.49 -0.003 -2.66 -0.003 -3.07
RESTRit  lnef;t 1 0.011 0.88 0.011 0.91 0.007 0.59
RESTRit  lnei;t 1 0.002 0.31 0.002 0.26 0.004 0.59
IRONit  ln
yf;t 1
yi;t 1 -0.002 -0.59 -0.002 -0.59 -0.001 -0.32
IRONit  lnef;t 1 -0.019 -0.15 -0.018 -0.14 -0.033 -0.28
IRONit  lnei;t 1 -1.054 -0.14 -1.135 -0.15 0.334 0.05
TRANSit 0.002 1.40 0.003 2.11 0.003 2.16 0.002 1.93
GUESTit 0.002 0.90 0.002 1.17 0.002 1.12 0.002 0.98
RESTRit 0.001 1.39 0.002 1.78 0.002 1.81 0.001 1.57
IRONit -0.001 -0.91 -0.001 -0.81 -0.001 -0.81 -0.001 -0.74
WARit 0.007 4.82 0.008 4.93 0.008 4.98 0.006 3.26
CONSTANT 0.002 2.15 0.002 1.98 0.003 2.26 0.002 1.83
observations 552 529 529 529
groups 28 28 28 28
R2 0.870 0.880
Wald (48)2 stat. 79,284 109,568
RMSPE 12.90 12.33 9.11 8.94
Notes: The dependent variable is the migration stock mstit.– FE (1) and FE (2) are ﬁxed
eﬀects regressions.– FGLS (1) is a Feasible GLS regression with panel-speciﬁc weights.
– FGLS (2) is a Feasible GLS regression with panel-speciﬁc weights and panel speciﬁc
autocorrelation (AR1).– RMSPE denotes the root mean squared percentage error.
34Table 3: Scenarios of potential migration from NMS-8 into EU-15, 2004-11
DE UK EU-15
stock net ﬂow stock net ﬂow stock net ﬂow
in 1,000 persons
transitional arrangement scenario
2004 438.9 30.3 121.0 -1.5 949.5 56.9
2005 481.7 42.8 219.8 98.8 1,195.9 246.4
2006 525.1 43.4 357.5 137.7 1,505.0 309.1
2007 554.4 29.3 609.4 251.9 1,910.4 405.4
2008 589.2 34.8 725.5 116.1 2,240.8 242.7
2009 621.2 32.0 832.4 106.9 2,464.3 223.5
2010 650.6 29.4 930.7 98.2 2,669.7 205.4
2011 677.6 27.0 1,020.7 90.0 2,857.9 188.2
∑
2004-11 269.0 898.2 1,877.5
free movement scenario
2004 438.9 211.6 121.0 53.9 1,270.0 393.0
2005 650.5 186.0 168.4 47.4 1,615.3 345.3
2006 836.5 167.5 211.1 42.7 1,926.3 311.0
2007 1,004.0 159.4 251.7 40.6 2,222.3 296.0
2008 1,163.4 148.7 289.6 37.9 2,498.4 276.1
2009 1,312.1 138.5 324.9 35.3 2,755.5 257.1
2010 1,450.5 128.8 357.7 32.8 2,994.7 239.2
2011 1,579.3 119.7 388.2 30.5 3,216.9 222.2
∑
2004-11 1,260.1 321.1 2,339.8
Notes: The 2004-07 ﬁgures in the transitional arrangement scenario refer to actual
migration ﬂows and stocks, the 2008-11 ﬁgures are projected based on the regression
results of model (4) in Table 2 and the assumption that the shares of Germany and the
UK in the cumulative net ﬂows during the period 2004-07 remain constant until 2011. –
The ﬁgures of the free movement scenario are based on the regression results of model (4)
in Table 2 and the assumption that the shares of Germany and UK in the 2003 migration
stock from the NMS-8 in the EU-15 remain constant until 2011.– The scenarios are based
on the further assumptions that (i) the GDP per capita level at current market prices of
the NMS-8 converges at a rate of 3 per cent p.a. to that of the EU-15 and (ii) that the
unemployment rates remain constant at their 2007 level. – Net ﬂow ﬁgures are assumed
to be equal to the change in migration stocks.




UK DE UK DE UK DE
change in %,
unemployment rate: change in %-points
real GDP 2.24 0.64 1.08 1.59 0.65 -0.44
real GDP per capita 0.48 0.30 0.84 0.29 -0.36 0.01
private consumption 2.62 1.44 1.45 2.33 1.17 -0.89
investment 2.56 0.98 1.40 2.33 1.16 -1.35
government consumption 2.32 0.51 1.08 2.28 1.24 -1.77
tax revenue 2.54 0.68 1.35 1.55 1.29 -0.87
exports to EU4 countries 4.03 2.26 2.86 2.78 1.17 -0.52
exports to RoW5 countries 2.98 0.05 1.82 0.59 1.16 -0.54
imports from EU countries 5.05 4.03 3.83 5.18 1.22 -1.15
imports from RoW countries 4.17 1.82 2.84 2.88 1.33 -1.06
capital income 1.35 0.25 0.48 0.95 0.87 -0.70
wage rate 0.60 -0.05 0.77 -0.50 -0.17 0.45
employment 2.20 0.40 0.79 1.87 1.41 -1.47
unemployment rate -0.23 0.15 -0.30 0.43 0.07 -0.28
Notes: 1) The transitional arrangement scenario assumes that Germany maintains its
migration restrictions and that UK keeps its labour markets open until 2011.– 2) The free
movement scenario assumes that all EU-15 countries grant free movement for workers
from the NMS-8 from 2004.– 3) The diversion eﬀect is calculated as the diﬀerence
between the transitional arrangement and the free movement scenario.– 4) EU coun-
tries are the other EU-25 member states.– 5) RoW countries are all other trading partners.




UK DE UK DE UK DE
change of value added in %
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 1.0 -0.2
Fishing -4.1 3.6 -5.0 2.7 0.9 0.9
Mining and quarrying -4.5 2.2 -4.3 2.9 -0.2 -0.7
Manufacturing 3.3 0.1 2.0 0.6 1.3 -0.5
Electricity, gas and water supply 2.0 0.6 0.9 1.6 1.1 -1.0
Construction 2.4 0.7 1.3 2.1 1.1 -1.4
Wholesale and retail trade 2.2 -0.2 1.0 0.3 1.2 -0.5
Hotels and restaurants 2.4 1.2 1.3 2.3 1.1 -1.1
Transport, storage and communication 1.6 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.1 -1.0
Financial intermediation 1.9 0.1 0.8 1.2 1.1 -1.1
Real estate, renting and business activities 1.7 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.1 -0.8
Public administration and defence 2.3 0.5 1.1 2.2 1.2 -1.7
Education 2.2 0.6 1.0 2.2 1.2 -1.6
Health and social work 2.3 0.6 1.1 2.3 1.2 -1.7
Other service activities 2.0 0.4 0.8 1.7 1.2 -1.3
Activities of households 2.3 1.5 1.0 2.6 1.3 -1.1
Total 2.1 0.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 -0.9
Notes: 1) The transitional arrangement scenario assumes that Germany maintains its
migration restrictions and that UK keeps its labour markets open until 2011.– 2) The
free movement scenario assumes that all EU-15 countries grant free movement for
workers from the NMS-8 from 2004.– 3) The diversion eﬀect is calculated as the
diﬀerence between the transitional arrangement and the free movement scenario.–
37Table A1: Key parameter values of the CGE model
elasticities of Armington
substitution elasticities
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.8 2.2
Fishing 0.8 2.2
Mining and quarrying 0.8 2.8
Manufacturing 0.8 2.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.8 2.8
Construction 0.8 1.9
Wholesale and retail trade 0.8 1.9
Hotels and restaurants 0.8 1.9
Transport, storage and communication 0.8 1.9
Financial intermediation 0.8 1.9
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.8 1.9
Public administration and defence 0.8 1.9
Education 0.8 1.9
Health and social work 0.8 1.9
Other service activities 0.8 1.9
Activities of households 0.8 1.9
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